Vertical Restraints and Antitrust Policy
RichardA. Posnert
Antitrust policy toward vertical restraints is the biggest substantive issue facing antitrust. (The biggest procedural/institutional/
administrative issue is overlapping enforcement authority -federal,
state, and foreign, especially EU.) The Justice Department's suit
against Microsoft put the issue on the map. I shall touch on exclusive
dealing, tying, bundling, and loyalty rebates, but I warn the reader that
the touch will in places be quite light.
I want to begin by correcting the widespread impression that the
issue of what if anything to do about vertical practices is an issue between the Chicago school of antitrust policy and the so-called postChicago school in any but an historical sense. The possibility that vertical practices, or as I would prefer to call them unilateral abuses of
market power, can reduce economic welfare was recognized almost
half a century ago by Aaron Director (the doyen of Chicago antitrust
thinking) and Edward Levi in their discussion of the StandardFashion
case.
Neither the Supreme Court's opinion nor Director and Levi's
discussion of the case goes deeply into its actual facts, so the summary
that follows is better regarded as a hypothetical than as a true account
of economic history. Standard Fashion manufactured a popular line of
dress patterns that women could use to make their own dresses. So
popular was its line that "dry goods" stores (stores that sold bolts of
cloth for making clothing) wanted very much to be able to sell it. They
would therefore be inclined to agree to carry Standard Fashion's line
exclusively. Competing manufacturers of dress patterns could, in principle, have created their own retail outlets, but who would shop there
if the most popular brand could not be found? Competing manufacturers would have had to create a line as long and as popular as Standard Fashion's line, and that may have been very costly to do.
I This is the revised draft of a paper delivered on June 18, 2004, at an antitrust conference
sponsored by the John M. Olin Program in Law and Economics and The University of Chicago
Law Review. I thank Dennis Carlton and Benjamin Klein for their very helpful comments on a
previous draft, and Liss Palamkunnel for her excellent research assistance.
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Standard Fashion Co v Magrane-Houston Co, 258 US 346 (1922). See Aaron Director
and Edward H. Levi, Law and the Future: Trade Regulation, 51 Nw U L Rev 281, 293 (1956).
StandardFashionwas a Clayton Act § 3 rather than a Sherman Act § 2 case, but that is (or ought
to be) a distinction without a difference.
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What distinguished Standard Fashion from a garden-variety exclusive dealing case was the existence of economies of scope at the
distribution level. Consumers didn't want to traipse from store to
store. They wanted a full line in each store. So any manufacturer entering the dress patterns business would have to provide the full line if
it was excluded from stores that carried the dominant firm's line. This
may seem a surprising suggestion given the existence of department
stores, which carry the products of many producers, most of whom
don't offer a full line of products. One can imagine a number of designers of women's dress patterns, each specializing in one pattern,
and the department store assembling them into a full line to compete
with Standard Fashion's full line. However, it appears that in 1914,
when the exclusive dealing contract at issue in the case was signed,
not only did many smaller communities lack department stores, but
unlike dry goods stores department stores catered to women who
wanted to buy ready-made clothes rather than make their own
clothes.
Restricting its retailers must have cost Standard Fashion something. But maybe less than the increase in its profits from forestalling
new entry by compelling prospective entrants to enter on a full-line
basis. The point is not that the new entrant would have to invest more
capital but that it would have to embark on a riskier and hence costlier undertaking, that of creating not a single successful product but a
whole line of such products. (Standard Fashion claimed that a retailer
should carry "at least two sizes of nearly all the styles"-and there
were 1200 styles available at any given time, with 60 being added
every month.)5 It is as if one weren't permitted to make commercial
aircraft without making military aircraft as well.
But the fact that exclusionary conduct is not costless to the firm
engaging in it highlights a general and significant difference between
horizontal and vertical restraints. When two competing firms agree to
fix prices or to merge, it is easy to see how both are better off and
(unless the merger generates significant efficiencies) consumers are
worse off. Not that collusion or merger involves no transaction costs,
but the benefits are highly likely to exceed those costs because the

2
See Transcript of Record, Opening Statement by Robert G. Dodge, Standard Fashion Co
v Magrane-HoustonCo, No 552, *28 (S Ct filed Mar 13, 1918).
3
See H. Pasdermadjian, The Department Store: Its Origins, Evolution and Economics 36
(Newman 1954).
4
See William R. Leach, Transformations in a Culture of Consumption: Women and Department Stores, 1890-1925, 71 J Am Hist 319,327 (1984).
5 Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the
First Circuit, StandardFashion Co v Magrane-Houston Co, No 552, *23 (S Ct filed Sept 27,1919).
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deal has a "win-win" character. But when a firm imposes a cost on its
dealers or other customers, and therefore has to compensate them and
so incurs a higher cost itself, it is difficult to see how the arrangement
will generate a net benefit for the firm. It is that difficulty that made
the Chicago school skeptical about vertical restraints, notwithstanding
its recognition that Standard Fashion may have been a case in which a
vertical restraint was a rational anticompetitive practice. The Chicago
school's skepticism was heightened by the economically dubious arguments commonly made to support the condemnation of vertical
restraints, such as the leverage theory of tying or the proposition that
imperfections in the capital market would prevent a new entrant from
financing entry on reasonable terms.
It is only recently that antitrust scholars have begun to establish
systematically the conditions that sometimes make vertical restraints
rational methods of maximizing profits by reducing competition.
To the extent that these scholars are persuasive, their findings are
consistent with the fundamental premise of the Chicago schoolrevolutionary when first declared-that antitrust issues should be analyzed on the assumption that business firms are rational profit maximizers, so that the standard theorems of price theory can be used to
predict the competitive effects of a challenged transaction.
An important implication of this approach with respect to vertical restraints is that, precisely because they are costly to a firm imposing them unless they benefit the dealer or distributor, only a firm
whose monopoly is fragile-that is, vulnerable to new entry-will im-

pose vertical restraints to exclude competition. This point was missed
in Robert Bork's criticism of the Standard Fashion decision. He argued that Standard Fashion couldn't extract a monopoly price from its
dealers twice, first by charging them what the market would bear and
then by forcing them to enter into exclusive dealing contracts. That is
true -and is one of the Chicago school's original criticisms of antitrust
policy toward vertical restraints. But what Standard Fashion may have
been able to do was increase the duration of its monopoly, which
might have collapsed sooner otherwise. Bork also criticizes the decision on the ground that Standard Fashion did not actually have a monopoly; its share of the patterns market was only 40 percent. But that
was its nationwide share, and the Supreme Court pointed out that in
6
The literature is now extensive. See, for example, Dennis W. Carlton and Michael
Waldman, The Strategic Use of Tying to Preserve and Create Market Powerin Evolving Industries,
33 RAND J Econ 194 (2002); Dennis W. Carlton, A GeneralAnalysis of Exclusionary Conduct
and Refusal to Deal- Why Aspen and Kodak Are Misguided,68 Antitrust L J 659 (2001).
7
Robert H. Bork, The Antitrust Paradox:APolicy at War with Itself305-07 (Free Press 2d
ed 1993).
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many small towns Standard Fashion probably was the only supplier of
patterns.8 And it was small towns that were least likely to have department stores.
The likelihood that monopoly profits obtained during the extension period (as I'll call the period for which a monopoly is extended
by means of exclusionary practices) will exceed the costs of the exclusionary practice to the monopolist is enhanced if, as in Standard Fashion, the monopoly is of intellectual property. Remember that the
company was selling dress patterns, not the dresses themselves. Intellectual property often exhibits a yawning gap between average and
marginal cost. In the extreme case, which is approximated in some
software markets, marginal cost is close to zero. This means that almost all the revenues earned by a firm that monopolizes the market
go directly to the bottom line if it has already recovered its fixed costs,
or, if it has not, to pay off those costs. The gap between price and marginal cost makes it entirely plausible that the gain from extending the
monopoly another year or two will exceed the cost of the exclusionary
practices required to obtain the extension. Standard Fashion probably
incurred most of its costs in creating the dress patterns, and once they
were created and the costs of creating them thus were sunk, the marginal cost of additional copies may have been slight, making each additional sale highly profitable.
This suggests, however, an alternative, nonmonopolistic reason
for Standard Fashion's exclusive dealing contracts. Unless its dress
patterns were copyrightable, imitators could produce cheap copies and
retailers could offer them to the consuming public side by side with
Standard Fashion's originals, but at a lower price attractive to many
consumers. This would make it difficult for Standard to recover its
sunk costs of creating the patterns. This rationale for exclusive dealing
is nonmonopolistic, although it limits competition in the short run,
because to the extent that it merely enables Standard to internalize
the benefits of its upfront investment it does not reduce economic
efficiency. However, the qualification in "merely" is important, as we'll
see shortly.
The point particularly to be emphasized is that the cost of an exclusionary practice, especially in intellectual property markets, need
not always exceed the additional monopoly profits that the practice
makes possible. This is so, incidentally, even though that cost may have
been incurred before the additional sales that it enabled, which would
require discounting any profits from those sales to present value before comparing them to the cost.
8

Standard Fashion,258 US at 357.
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But reference to fragile monopolies and to intellectual property
highlights the complicating consideration that I touched on in suggesting an alternative, nonmonopolistic rationale for Standard Fashion's
exclusive dealing. A monopoly might be fragile because it had been
obtained by investment in an innovation (it could be a novel and attractive dress pattern) that, once created, could be cheaply imitated.
That is one of the situations in which marginal cost is likely to lie below average total cost. The cost of creating the innovation is incurred
before production begins but must be recouped, if at all, by the price
charged per unit of output. If the cost of production is low, copiers will
be able to undersell the innovator at a profit. This is not quite so attractive a tactic as it seems, because to defend its position the existing
market occupant may price down to marginal cost and thus make new
entry unprofitable. Nevertheless, if entry into an innovator's monopoly market is feasible, the return to innovation will be less. This is the
basic rationale of intellectual property rights. If those rights are
thought to be too narrowly defined, there is an argument for allowing
innovators to use contracts with their customers to obtain additional
monopoly protection, as apparently Standard Fashion was doing. My
own view, however, is that at present intellectual property rights are
too broadly rather than too narrowly defined. Although economists
continue to believe that the social return to research and development
exceeds the private return, the attempt to equalize those returns
through relentless expansion of intellectual property rights is probably
a mistake because of the heavy licensing costs that are imposed when
areas of research and development are blanketed by thickets of patents and copyrights.!
Exclusive dealing, the specific practice in Standard Fashion, is
analytically the same as tying, and so what I have said about that case
covers exclusionary tying cases as well. Exclusive dealing ties distribution to manufacturing; equivalently, tying is exclusive dealing in the
tied product. So all we need is sensible law on exclusive dealing in
order to be able to deal sensibly with tying cases (at least contractual
tying cases, as distinct from technological tying cases, where the tied
product is physically integrated with the tying product-such cases
present particularly acute evidentiary and remedial difficulties). In
fact, the rules should be identical (again with a possible exception for
technological tying). Suppose that the tying and the tied products are
complements, such as a hammer and nails, and that there are economies of scale in the manufacture or sale of the tied product, corre9 This is a theme in William M. Landes and Richard A. Posner, The Economic Structure of
Intellectual Property Law (Harvard 2003).
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sponding to the economies of scope in distribution that I have argued
is the key to understanding Standard Fashion as a case that may have
involved a genuinely exclusionary practice. A firm that wants to enter
the market for the tying product, but because of the tying arrangement is denied access to existing producers of the tied product (they
are owned, or contractually controlled, by the monopoly producer of
the tying product, who will permit the sale of nails only to the purchasers of his hammers), will have to produce the tied product as well
because of the complementarity I mentioned; no one will buy a hammer if he can't buy nails as well. And so the new entrant will have
higher costs than the incumbent because, as a newcomer, it will not be
able to achieve the incumbent's economies of scale. In contrast, if nails
are produced by an independent firm, the price per nail will be the
same (barring quantity or volume discounts) to small as to large buyers. So the tie-in, by forcing the newcomer to make nails, will reduce
its expected gain from entering the market for the tying product.
This is not the old "leverage" theory, the theory that a tie-in is intended to give a monopolist a second source of monopoly profits-the
sale of nails at a monopoly price. The tie-in is intended rather to protect the first monopoly. Nor is the theory that it is difficult, because of
capital market problems, to obtain the additional capital needed to
enter two markets rather than one. Rather, the analysis turns on the
assumption that there are economies of scale in the manufacture of
the tied product, so that the prospective entrant if he manufactures it
himself will incur higher costs than if he bought it on the open market.
The analysis also depends, as before, on the assumption that the monopolist's monopoly is insecure, so that it pays him to incur some costs
to prevent new entry.
Bundling is analytically similar to tying. In bundling, the "tied"
product is given away, which means that in effect the seller is paying
the buyer to buy it, whereas in tying, the buyer is forced to buy the
tied product as a condition of obtaining the tying product. So it looks
like carrot versus stick but really it's two carrots, since a seller cannot
actually force people to do anything. Bundling is the equivalent of
offering a discount off the price of the tying product. But tying is the
same. To induce the buyer to buy an unwanted extra (if it's wanted,
there is no need for a tie) or a wanted extra at a supracompetitive
price (the case when tying is used as a method of price discrimination,
because then the price of the tying product is in effect transferred to
the normally cheap tied product), the seller must offer a better deal on
the tying product than he would otherwise have to do. He might, for
example, in a case in which the tied product was the device for extracting consumer surplus, give away the tying product.
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The usual purpose of bundling, as of tying, is price discrimination.
Suppose (to take an old example of George Stigler's) that a firm sells
two products, X and Y, that are worth different amounts to different
customers. Assume that the firm has two customers for these products,
A and B, and A would pay $8,000 for X and $2,500 for Y while B
would pay $7,000 for X and $3,000 for Y. If the firm were to price X
and Y separately, its best price for X would be $7,000 and for Y $2,500,
and so its total revenue would be $19,000. If it sells X and Y as a package, however, it can charge $10,000 for the package and thus obtain a
total revenue of $20,000; the package is worth more than $10,000 to
both A and B because of the value that each places on one of the
items in the package.0 When the products are priced separately, the
price is depressed by the buyer who values the product less; the bundling eliminates this effect. A is the low-elasticity demander of X,
B the low-elasticity demander of Y; bundling enables the seller to discriminate against A with respect to X and B with respect to Y while
charging them the same price so that arbitrage is prevented.
The profitability of bundling is greater, the more products that
can be bundled." For this makes it more likely that the package will
contain products for which different consumers have different elasticities of demand, as in the numerical example, where A values X more
than B does, while B values Y more than A does.
The effect of price discrimination on economic welfare may be
generally negative, though no stronger statement is possible and it is
necessary in evaluating that effect to distinguish between two types of
discrimination, what the economics literature confusingly refers to as
"third degree" and "second degree" price discrimination.'2 In thirddegree price discrimination, the customers are segmented according to
their elasticity of demand and a separate price is charged to each seg10 See George J. Stigler, A Note on Block Booking, in George J. Stigler, ed, The Organization of Industry 165 (Chicago 1983). See also William James Adams and Janet L. Yellen, Commodity Bundling and the Burden of Monopoly, 90 Q J Econ 475 (1976). An alternative explanation of block booking in the film industry is presented in Roy W. Kenney and Benjamin Klein,
The Economics of Block Booking, 26 J L & Econ 497 (1983). Their explanation is unrelated to
monopoly or discrimination, but instead emphasizes transaction cost savings and optimization of
marginal incentives.
11 See Yannis Bakos and Erik Brynjolfsson, Bundling and Competition on the Internet, 19
Marketing Sci 63 (2000).
12 For an excellent analysis, see Benjamin Klein and John Shepard Wiley Jr., Competitive
Price Discriminationas an Antitrust Justification for Intellectual Property Refusals to Deal, 70
Antitrust L J 599, 612-15 (2003). "First degree" price discrimination is perfect price discrimination, and is infeasible; in perfect price discrimination price varies with the elasticity of demand of
each potential customer for each quantity demanded, and as a result the seller never turns away
a customer willing to pay at least the marginal cost of supplying him. The output under perfect
price discrimination is therefore the competitive output.
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ment. As a result, some customers are charged more than in a singleprice system, others less, and the net effect on output is on average
neutral.'3 Given that output is not (on average) higher, the costs of
implementing third-degree price discrimination, which involve obtaining information on the elasticities of demand of different types of customer, setting different prices, and preventing arbitrage (that is, resale
by customers charged lower prices to customers charged higher
prices), are a deadweight loss; in addition, if the product is an input
into the customers' businesses (rather than a consumer product), different prices to competing customers will distort competition at their
level. In second-degree price discrimination, which is illustrated by
tying and by bundling, a single price is charged that varies with (presumed) elasticity. For example, if the monopolist of hammers controls
the supply of nails and "licenses" the use of his hammers at a price
determined by how many nails the licensee uses, he will be charging a
higher total price to customers who value hammering more. There are
still costs of implementing the discriminatory scheme-and in fact
they may be high; perhaps the monopolist will redesign his hammer so
that it works only with the nails that he supplies. There is a greater
likelihood that these costs will be offset by an increase in output than
in the case of third-degree price discrimination, but it is not even certain that there will be an increase in output. Elasticity of demand may
well be correlated with amount of use, but surely not perfectly; large
users may for example have a greater ability than small ones to arrange for substitutes for the monopolized product.
Even in the case of second-degree price discrimination, the fact
that the net effect on economic welfare is probably negative would
not be a persuasive ground for forbidding such discrimination. Such a
project would be quixotic at best, if only because of the difficulty for
courts of distinguishing between cost-based and purely discriminatory
price differences. But that is an aside. The point I want to make is that
in the setting of intellectual property the welfare effects even of second-degree price discrimination are likely often to be positive." Pricing equal to marginal cost may be infeasible if fixed costs are a very
large fraction of total costs because in that situation a price equal to
marginal cost will not cover total costs unless marginal cost rises
steeply with output. In software and other digital markets, as I have
already noted, marginal cost is often close to zero, though fixed costs,
and therefore total costs, are substantial. In such markets, price discrimination may be more efficient than a uniform price that exceeds
13
14

See Richard A. Posner, Antitrust Law 82-84 (Chicago 2d ed 2001).
Id.
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marginal cost, which would tend to attract inefficient entry, while pricing at marginal cost would not cover total costs. The films involved in
the block booking case were of course intellectual property.
It might seem that price discrimination would always have this
desirable feature of encouraging investment by increasing firms' profitability. But this is doubtful on several grounds: the higher prices to
some (business) customers, which would reduce their incentive to invest; the deflection of resources to industries in which price discrimination is feasible at low cost from industries in which it is not; and the
tendency of monopolistic profits to induce inefficient entry.
As with exclusive dealing, bundling can discourage piecemeal entry." Microsoft's Windows operating system contains a number of
separate programs, including a browser, and since a single price is
charged for the entire system the marginal cost of any of the component programs to the consumer is zero, making it difficult for anyone
to compete who is not prepared to supply an entire operating system.
Of course there may be alternative ways to make money on a new
program without charging for it directly-Netscape demonstrated
how with its very lucrative home page. The government's theory in the
Microsoft case was that Microsoft wanted to throttle Netscape because the Netscape browser might (in conjunction with Java software)
become a substitute for Windows. 6 Throttling Netscape might increase
the duration of the Windows monopoly, and we know from the earlier
discussion how profitable such prolongation can be when marginal
costs are very low, and they are especially low in the case of software.
The alternative explanation for the zero price of the Microsoft
browser, however, is that zero is the natural price of a browser because the cheaper the browser to the user, the greater the value of
internet access and hence of a computer and hence of Windows. In
other words, the browser and the operating system are complementary, and what matters to the consumer (putting aside differences
among consumers' elasticities of demand that might enable price discrimination) is the joint price rather than how the price is allocated
between the complementary items. If everyone who buys a computer
wants software that includes a browsing capability, it makes sense to
build the browser into the operating system and not charge separately
for it, just as auto manufacturers don't charge separately for the
wheels on their cars.

See generally Barry Nalebuff, Bundling as an Entry Barrier,119 0 J Econ 159 (2004).
United States v Microsoft Corp, 253 F3d 34, 54 (DC Cir 2001) (noting that the focus of
the charge was "Microsoft's attempts to suppress [Netscape and Java's] threat to its operating
system monopoly").
15
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A plausible example of an anticompetitive use of bundling comes
from the airline industry; I mean the curious practice (now waning) of
some airlines in charging more for a one-way ticket than for a roundtrip ticket." There is some load-balancing benefit to an airline from
such a practice, but the penalty seems disproportionate to that benefit,
and the size of the penalty may well reflect a desire to increase the
cost of piecemeal entry into city pairs; that would make it analytically
similar to the Standard Fashion case. Suppose a new airline has only
one flight a day from A to B and from B to A, while the existing carriers 8 have several. A passenger might want to fly from A to B on the
new carrier-the flight is scheduled at a convenient time-yet not
want to fly back at the time when the carrier's sole daily return flight
from B to A is scheduled. He would prefer to fly back on a competing
carrier. Faced with a choice between paying double and flying back at
an inconvenient time, he is quite likely to decide to fly both ways on
one of the major airlines. The major carriers lose the business of passengers who are not flying round trip, but on balance may profit from
making it difficult for the new carrier to gain a foothold, especially
since the marginal cost of airline service is below average cost. Of
course, they will be keeping out the new airline only if the newcomer
cannot enter the market on the same scale as the existing airlines. But
entry on that scale may indeed be unattractive, as it would be considerably riskier, in part because by injecting substantial new capacity
into the market it would place enormous pressure on price. It is another case, like Standard Fashion,in which economies of scope in distribution may make the use of vertical restraints a rational method of
excluding new competition.
A new area of antitrust concern with vertical restraints involves
loyalty rebates, and let me end by trying to fit them into the analytical
scheme that I have been sketching. The issue is brought into sharp
focus by the fascinating case of LePage'sInc v 3M (Minnesota Mining
and Manufacturing Co).'9 To review the essential facts bearing on the
rebates issue (there was also an exclusive dealing issue, but I won't
discuss that), the defendant, 3M, manufactures Scotch tape, which until the early 1990s had about 90 percent of the market for transparent
tape, assumed to be sufficiently distinct from other binding materials
to count as a relevant market for antitrust purposes. In 1980 LePage's
had started making transparent tape for sale under retailers' private17 This bundling occurs in coach only.
18 So this is not a case of perpetuating a monopoly. But oligopolists engaged in tacit or
express collusion also have an incentive to exclude new entry if they can do so at a cost less than
the gain from exclusion.
19 324 F3d 141 (3d Cir 2003) (en banc), cert denied 124 S Ct 2932 (2004).
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brand labels. It made considerable inroads into sales of Scotch tape,
and 3M responded by beginning to market its own private-label tape.
LePage's suit arose from the fact that 3M offered end-of-year rebates
to retailers that bought multiple lines of 3M products, which gave the
retailers a strong incentive to buy 3M's private-label transparent tape
in preference to LePage's. LePage's market share dropped," and eventually (though after the case was decided) it abandoned the market.
What is one to make of such a scenario? The rebates never
brought 3M's price, whether for Scotch tape or for private-label tape,
below its costs, so LePage's could not maintain its suit as a predatory
pricing case. Even if all the rebates were allocated to 3M's privatelabel tape, the price of that tape would still exceed the cost, which
gave rise to 3M's argument that LePage's must have been a less efficient producer. Nor was the case (so far as the loyalty rebates were
concerned) an exclusive dealing or tying case, since no retailer was
required to buy 3M's private-label tape as a condition of being allowed to buy Scotch tape. But there was evidence that because the
retailers regarded carrying Scotch tape as indispensable to their business-in much the same way that dry goods stores may have regarded
carrying Standard Fashion's dress patterns as indispensable to their
business-they had a strong incentive to buy their private-label tape
as well from 3M, since that would reduce the effective price they were
paying for Scotch tape.
It is true that if LePage's private-label costs were the same as
3M's, LePage's could have matched 3M's rebates yet still have broken
even, since as I noted if all the rebates were allocated to 3M's privatelabel tape, 3M would still not have been selling that tape below cost.
But it would hardly be feasible for LePage's to match the rebates on a
customer-by-customer basis. It would have to make a uniform price
cut. But a uniform price cut would confer a windfall on those stores
that did not have a strong demand for Scotch tape and so did not receive big rebates from 3M, while probably not being deep enough to
match the rebates received by those stores that did have a strong demand for Scotch tape and so earned very large rebates.
If so, the rebates (a form or variant of bundling) can plausibly be
understood as a means of exclusion because they imposed greater
costs on LePage's than on 3M; the inference of exclusionary conduct is
strengthened by the fact that the evidence of economies of joint distribution was weak. Yet the court appears to have assumed that 3M
was a more efficient producer of private-label tape than LePage's, and
if that is so it is hard to see the point of antitrust intervention; the anti20

LePage's,324 F3d at 160-61.
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trust concern is with the exclusion of equally or more efficient competitors. 2' However, 3M may well have been more efficient than
LePage's not because it had lower unit costs but merely because there
are economies of scale in producing transparent tape; there was in fact
evidence of such economies.22 There is a difference from the standpoint of economic welfare between efficiency based on lower labor or
materials costs, superior management, better quality, and other firmspecific attributes, and efficiency based on scale, which is attainable by
any firm that is able to increase its output to the efficient scale.
Economies of scale are a market rather than a firm attribute. To the
extent that the loyalty rebates raised LePage's average costs by
shrinking its output and thus preventing it from achieving the available economies of scale, this was not a consequence of 3M being a
more efficient company in a sense relevant to antitrust policy. 3M may
have feared that if LePage's was permitted to get up to speed, powerful retailers such as Office Depot and Wal-Mart would prefer to sell a
cheaper private-label tape than to push Scotch tape, and the brand
would lose its luster.
An alternative, nonexclusionary explanation for 3M's loyalty rebates is that, as with many other cases of bundling, they were a
method of price discrimination. Some retailers doubtless value Scotch
tape more highly than private-label tape, and others have the reverse
valuation. The rebates provide in effect a single price for a bundle
consisting of the two products (I ignore the other products covered by
the rebates). The retailers who prefer Scotch tape would see the rebates as a way of being able to buy Scotch tape cheaper, while the retailers who prefer private-label tape would see the rebates as a way of
being able to buy private-label tape cheaper.
Still another possibility is that loyalty rebates are intended to induce-loyalty. Another name for that might be low transaction costs
and customer inertia, which might be another name for economizing
on transaction costs. Once a firm gets accustomed to satisfying its
needs for transparent tape by buying from 3M, any newcomer will
have to compensate the firm for the risk and (other) costs of switching; that will make new entry less attractive, yet for good economic
reasons. Volume discounts are probably best explained on these
grounds, and no one supposes them to be suspect under antitrust law.
As the examples I have been discussing illustrate, there are decent theoretical reasons for concern that vertical restraints can have
anticompetitive consequences, though probably in only a small minor21
22

See Posner, Antitrust Law at 194-97 (cited in note 13).
LePage's,324 F3d at 161.
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ity of cases in which they are employed. Yet even in suspicious cases
there invariably are multiple possible economic reasons for a challenged practice-no responsible student of antitrust policy is about to
suggest that bundling, discounting, exclusive dealing, volume discounts, customer rebates, or even tying should be presumptively
unlawful-and sorting out the reasons in particular cases will often be
very difficult. It is easier to conjecture anticompetitive motives for
such practices than it is to determine the practices' actual or even (in
contrast to cartel cases) likely economic consequences. Another reason to question the appropriateness of aggressive enforcement action
against vertical restraints is that, as I have stressed, they are effective
exclusionary practices only in situations of fragile monopoly. And in
such situations market forces may work as fast as or faster than antitrust litigation to destroy monopoly.
In the end, then, the issue of the proper antitrust stance toward
vertical restraints may be procedural and institutional as much as it is
analytical: how to enforce antitrust against practices that we are not
prepared to treat (as we are in the case of price fixing) as entirely
lacking in possible redeeming economic virtues. The rule of reason
may be a chimera, placing on courts analytical and evidentiary burdens that they cannot sustain. But that is a topic for another occasion.

